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Aims:  The ﬁnancing  of  General  Practice  (GP)  is  a much-debated  topic.  In  spite  of  out-
of-pocket  (OOP)  payment  for other  primary  health  care  provided  by  self-employed
professionals,  there  is  no OOP  payment  for the  use of GP  in  Denmark.  This  article  aims
to explore  the  arguments,  the  actors  and  the decision-making  context.
Methods  and materials:  An  analysis  of the  healthcare-policy  debate  in  Parliament  and
the media  from  1990  until September  2012.  The  materials  are  parliamentary  hear-
ings/discussions  and  newspaper  articles.  Kingdon’s  model  on  Policy  Windows  and  the
Advocacy  Coalition  framework  by  Sabatier  and  Jenkins  are  used  to  investigate  explanations.
Results:  The  arguments  from  the  proponents  are: that  OOP  payment  for GP  will  reduce
pressure  on the primary  sector;  that  the current  allocation  of OOP  payment  in  the  sector  is
historically  conditioned;  and  that  resistance  towards  OOP  payment  is  based  on emotions.
The main  argument  from  the  opponents  is  that OOP  payment  will increase  social  inequality
in  health.
Conclusions:  There  is little  connection  between  the  attitudes  and  ideological  backgrounds
of  the  political  parties.  Despite  factors  such  as perceived  expert/scientiﬁc  evidence  for  OOP
payment, changes  of  government,  ﬁnancial  crisis  and  a market-based  reform  wave,  no
government  has  introduced  OOP  payment  for GP.  This  article  suggests  that  governmental
positions,  public-  and  especially  health-professional  support  are  important  factors  in  the
decision-making  context.
© 2014  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the CC
BY-NC1. Introduction
Out-of-pocket payment in the healthcare sector is a
much-debated topic internationally, and also in Denmark.
What separates Denmark from several countries, even
other Scandinavian countries [1:19,2:62], is that there
is no out-of-pocket payment for the use of general
 Open Access for this article is made possible by a collaboration
between Health Policy and The European Observatory on Health Systems
and Policies.
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0168-8510/© 2014 Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access artic
by-nc-sa/3.0/).-SA  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
practitioners. Instead, the GPs are reimbursed by the
Danish regions via a combination of capitation and fee-
for-service [3:80]. GPs have been ﬁnanced via taxes since
1973, when the predecessors of the Danish regions, the
counties, took over the ‘insurance schemes’ [3:31] existing
at that time. Other services provided by self-employed pro-
fessionals (except private practicing specialists if referred
to by the GP) in the primary sector are subject to OOP
payment1, which makes the public ﬁnancing of GPs even
1 Physiotherapists, dentists, chiropractors, psychologists and pharma-
cies.
le under the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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Sabatier points out that even though the belief system
determines the direction in which the advocacy coalition
moves, its ability to move will be critically dependent uponC.A. Poulsen / Healt
ore interesting. However, the GPs do hold a special role
n the Danish health care system, as they act as gate-
eepers to all other services. There is no logical pattern
etermining whether a speciﬁc service is paid for by the
atient or the region/municipality [3:63–4]. Denmark has
ndergone extensive market rationale-based health sec-
or reforms during the past decades [4:44–5], but no steps
ave been taken towards changing the ﬁnancing of GP.
inally, Denmark had a liberal–conservative government in
001–2011 that could be expected to favour OOP payment
or GP because this potentially leads to lower taxes and is
ased on market mechanisms. From the above it appears
hat the GP area is ‘resistant’ to international inﬂuence and
he general marketisation of other parts of the healthcare
ystem. The question is why this is the case?
International peer-reviewed literature about OOP
ayment for GP has a ﬁnancial and behavioural per-
pective that focuses solely on the consequences of OOP
ayment: will OOP payment reduce the use of public ser-
ices and therefore have the potential to reduce the overall
xpenses? Will there be any healthcare consequences of
OP payment? Will OOP payment reduce the use by some
roups of the population more than by others? [5–21].
he purpose of this article is not to make conclusions
bout the effects of OOP payment, but to investigate and
iscuss the actors, arguments and the decision-making
ontext in the health care policy debate in order to provide
nsight into why OOP payment for GP is introduced or not.
his will be done via a systematic analysis of the media
ebate from 1990 to 2012 and by drawing on Kingdon’s
heory about policy windows [22] and Sabatier and Jenkins
dvocacy coalition framework [23,24]. The ﬁndings will
e of relevance to policy analysis in other high-income
ountries where the health care ﬁnancing structure and
olitical system are similar (for example, England, Norway,
weden etc.), as this creates better grounds for comparison
nd transferability. In the following, I will argue that the
nancing of the GP in Denmark is not dependent on the
olitical parties’ ideological backgrounds (which seems
o be the general notion in the debate) but is a question
f political feasibility and especially the support of health
rofessionals and the public.
. Methods and materials
The arguments in the healthcare-policy debate have
een identiﬁed via a systematic analysis of media and par-
iamentary debates from 1990 until September 2012. This
eriod of time was chosen due to an increase in the discus-
ion in the media, and because this was the prime time for
arket-based reforms of the healthcare sector [4:44–5].
Data from the parliamentary debates was found via
 search on the website of the Danish Parliament:
ww.folketinget.dk. The search was limited to documents
nder the ‘Parliamentary Health Committee’ [Sundheds og
orebyggelsesudvalget], ‘Parliamentary Finance Commit-
ee’ [Finansudvalget] and ‘Parliamentary Social Committee’
Socialudvalget]. These committees consider decisions
bout OOP payment for GP. The search terms were ‘out-
f-pocket payment’ [brugerbetaling] and ‘doctor’ [læge].
hree hearings/discussions included explicit discussion of 117 (2014) 64–71 65
OOP payment for GP. Data from the media debate was
found via a search in the Danish media database Infomedia.
The search strategy included the following search terms:
‘healthcare system [sundhedsvæsen] or health [sundhed]
and out-of-pocket payment [brugerbetaling]’. All national
newspapers and magazines were included because the
entire political spectrum was  to be covered. Local news-
papers were not included, as this would be too extensive.
In addition, legislation and decision-making about OOP
payment take place at national level [3:70] and the main
points would therefore be included in the national search.
Opinion articles and contributions to the debate from
individuals without political or expert status were not
included, because it was expected that the main political
points and arguments would be included in the polit-
ical/expert search. Twelve newspapers and magazines2
were included in the search and 1415 articles were found.
The main criterion for selection was that the article dis-
cussed OOP payment for General Practice directly and
contained arguments. The selection process resulted in 103
relevant articles.
The arguments were categorised into argument clus-
ters, which is to be understood as a collection of minor
arguments categorised under a single argument cover-
ing them all. This was done so as to create order and an
overview of the debate.
3. Theoretical frame
The results were investigated by using Kingdon’s three
streams and policy windows and Jenkins’ and Sabatier’s
advocacy coalition framework. Kingdon operates with pol-
icy windows, which are likely opportunities for policy
change. A policy window opens when the problem stream
(identiﬁcation of problems), the policy stream (identiﬁca-
tion of solutions (feasibility and support)), and the politics
stream (situational factors such as changes of government,
campaigns, swings of national moods, etc.) run together
[22]. The advocacy coalition framework focuses on the
interactions between opposing advocacy coalitions (actors
from a variety of positions who share a particular belief
system [24:139]), the analysis of factors explaining policy
change, and the explication of belief systems of oppos-
ing coalitions in which the characteristics of the policy
context lie [23:266–7]. Inhibitors for cross-coalition learn-
ing (agreement) are identiﬁed as: intense conﬂict where
neither coalition is willing to modify its belief system,
if the issue is highly analytically intractable (especially
where objects of the analysis are themselves advocates
in the debate), and if the issue is addressed in an open
political forum where the participants are highly hetero-
geneous [23:270]. Despite the focus on belief systems,2 Aktuelt, Berlingske, BT, Ekstra-Bladet, Jyllands-Posten, Kristeligt Dagblad,
Politiken, Weekendavisen, Mandag Morgen, Ugeskrift for læger (the Journal
of  the Danish Medical Association), Altinget, Information.
h Policy
of Governmental Research (AKF) in 2012 [96]. There are
three solutions attached to the problem: to remove all
OOP payment in the healthcare sector [30,97]; to allow66 C.A. Poulsen / Healt
its resources (money, expertise, number of supporters and
legal authorities) [24:147].
4. The debate
The debate about the ﬁnancing of GPs was ongoing
throughout the entire study period and began before 1990.
The debate increased from 2003 to 2007 and from 2009
to 2012. The analysis shows that there is variation in the
consistency of attitudes between political parties, interest
groups and experts. Where some political parties change
their attitude over time, interest groups, experts and the
general public maintain their respective attitudes. Fig. 1 is
an illustration of the party-political attitudes towards OOP
payment for GP.
The left-wing party (the Socialist People’s Party), the far
left-wing party (the Unity List) and the neoliberal party
(the Liberal Alliance)3 [25–33] act in accordance with their
respective ideological backgrounds. The conservative (Con-
servative Party [26,28,34–37]) and social-conservative (the
Danish People’s Party [26,27,36]) parties do the oppo-
site, as they reject OOP for GP4. The Social Liberal Party
changed its position in 2006 in both the parliamentary and
media debates, proposing a potential re-allocation of OOP
in the healthcare sector based on evidence [26,27,38,39]
(hence the shape of the arrow). The two largest parties
in Denmark, the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic
Party, which are presumably for and against OOP payment
for GP, respectively, changed their attitudes over time.
From the beginning of the 1990s until 2011 the Liberal
Party declared that it was against OOP payment for GP
[26,29,35,38,40–43], but changed its attitude after becom-
ing part of the opposition in 2011. The Social Democratic
Party politicians were originally against OOP payment in
the 1990s [41,44], but from 2006 and onwards the party
has been more open to a possible change in the alloca-
tion of OOP payment in the healthcare sector [36,38,45,46].
In 2011, however, after coming back into government,
the Social Democratic Party reverted to its original nega-
tive attitude [26,29,31,47]. The ﬁgure shows inconsistency
between the presumed attitudes based on ideology and the
attitudes articulated in the debate. This could imply that
the attitudes towards OOP payment for GP do not depend
entirely on ideological background but that other factors
such as feasibility, support and coalitions could be of impor-
tance. This will be investigated further after the content of
the arguments has been elaborated.
4.1. The content of the arguments
In the debate, the arguments are stable through all years.
The only aspect that changes is which players align them-
selves with the arguments. For this reason, the following
section will elaborate the identiﬁed clusters of argumen-
tation. The analysis shows that the content of the policy
discussion in the media and in parliamentary debates
3 Established in 2007.
4 The conservative was  for OOP payment for GP in a small time-period
at  the end of their Government period in 2011. 117 (2014) 64–71
can be divided into four clusters: (1) the introduction of
OOP payment for GP will reduce the pressure on the pri-
mary healthcare sector; (2) the current allocation of OOP
payment is historically conditioned and not rational; (3)
resistance towards OOP payment for GP is emotionally-
based politics; and (4) OOP payment for GP will lead to
increased social inequality in healthcare. Proposers of OOP
payment, who  dominate the debate, hold the ﬁrst three
cluster arguments, while the opponents hold the fourth.
4.1.1. “Reduction of use of General Practice”
It is a prevalent argument that introducing OOP
payment for GP will reduce the number of visits to general
practitioners [28,42,44,48–57]. Proponents argue that
people will ‘think about it one more time’ before consulting
their GP [55,56,58]. Embedded in this argument is an
understanding and distinction of GP visits as being either
necessary or unnecessary. Proponents argue that the
unnecessary visits will be reduced [54,59,60]. Opponents
such as the Organisation of General Practitioners in
Denmark5 and the Danish Medical Association6 argue that
unnecessary visits do not exist [41,61], because the visit
will only be seen as unnecessary after the consultation
[61]. There is a notion in the debate that money will be
saved if people consult their GPs less often [41]. However,
the Chairman of the Danish Medical Association contests
this by arguing that there will be no ﬁnancial beneﬁt if the
elderly, the chronically ill and children are not subject to
OOP payment, as these groups use their GPs the most [41].
4.1.2. “Historically-conditioned allocation of OOP (not
rational)”
The most prevalent argument in the debate is that the
allocation of OOP payment in the healthcare sector is based
on historical coincidence [26,32,38,44,48,50,56,57,62–89].
This appeared for the ﬁrst time in 1995 and has been
extremely prevalent ever since and was used increas-
ingly in 2010–2012. There is broad political and expert
agreement that the historically conditioned allocation
of OOP payment is a problem. The high element of
OOP payment for dental care is identiﬁed as a particu-
lar example of injustice [26,38,44,56,57,67,68]. All of the
individual ‘experts’ that appear in the media are health
economists and in favour of (some) OOP payment for
GP [28,35,36,38,43,46,65,68,69,90–92]. The experts and
their support for OOP payment for GP are supported
by reports published during the period of the study by
the Danish Institute for Health Services Research [93] in
1995; the Welfare Commission in 2005 [94]; the OECD
in 2008 [95]; and most recently by the Danish Institute5 The organisation of general practitioners in Denmark is a subdivision
of the Danish Medical Association and focuses on the professional and
ﬁnancial interests of general practitioners.
6 The Danish Medical Association is a an organisation for Danish doc-
tors and is recognised by Parliament, the Danish Health and Medicines
Authority, the ministries, and the private sector as an expert and advisory
body on medical questions [44].
C.A. Poulsen / Health Policy 117 (2014) 64–71 67
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lFig. 1. Political parties and attitudes towards OOP
he current system to remain [32,58,89,98]; or to re-
llocate OOP payment by introducing OOP payment for
Ps while reducing the proportion for other healthcare ser-
ices [26,38,44,48,50,56,57,62–89,98]. Most actors argue in
avour of re-allocating OOP payment, thereby introducing
OP payment for GP.
.1.3. “Resistance to OOP is emotionally-based politics”
Proponents argue and criticize that resistance to
OP payment is based on emotions. The primary argu-
ent is that OOP payment for GP is a political taboo
29,37,42,49,50,55,56,58,64,79,89,99–108]. The argument
ppears in the years 2006, 2008 and 2011. This aspect
hould be viewed in conjunction with the fact that dis-
ussions of OOP payment for GP increased in the years just
efore or while OOP payment was articulated as a taboo. In
he argument, metaphors from war and religion are used
42,64,99,101,106–109]. Via the argumentation, the lack of
OP payment is presented as being equivalent to religion,
hich implies that the resistance is based on emotions
ather than logic. Additionally, it is argued that politi-
ians are ‘scared’  of introducing OOP payment, due to the
xpected reduced electoral support [37,50,79,99,108,110].
urthermore, the resistance is identiﬁed as being automatic
nd non-reﬂective via such metaphors as ‘automatic gun’
nd ‘spinal reﬂexes’ [100,102,105]..1.4. Increase in social inequality in health
Opponents, especially the doctors’ unions, but also
olitical parties, argue that OOP payment for GP will
ead to a deterioration in health care for certain groupsnt for GP (no. of parliamentary seats in brackets).
[30,33,36,41,58,89,106,111–114]. The argument appears
several times in 1991, 1995 and especially in 2002–2003,
2008 and 2011. The most consistent opponents of
OOP payment for GP are the Organisation of General
Practitioners in Denmark (PLO) [29,36,40,41,61,65,
115–117], the Danish Medical Association [31,38,41,
90,118] and patient organisations [57,113]. The doctors’
unions follow the social inequality argument, focusing on
patient rights in particular [115,118].
In the debate it is argued that the current free access
to the GP and healthcare system is both a value in itself
[41,58,89,111,119] and a contributor to the reduction of
social inequality [30,41,89,111,114,120]. On investigat-
ing the argument it is interesting that there is no clear
deﬁnition of who is deﬁned as the vulnerable groups.
In the debate, the deﬁnitions appear to be based on
either the extent that GPs’ services are used (the elderly,
the chronically ill and children) [41,111]; social status
(the unemployed and the elderly) [33,41]; health status
(the elderly, the chronically ill) [36]; or economic status
(single mothers, immigrants and people with little edu-
cation) [112]. The doctors’ unions use a combination of
the weak-group deﬁnitions: low income and chronically
ill [36,40,61,116–118].
Both opponents and proponents agree that an increase
in social inequality in health care is not favourable, but
they have different solutions. Opponents completely
reject OOP payment as a solution, due to the possible
increase in social inequality, while proponents mod-
ify their proposal by drawing on the existence of OOP
payment for GP in the other Nordic countries [26,28,31,
34,42,44,46,50,52,55,57–60,41,62,66,69,79,80,92,107,109,
h Policy68 C.A. Poulsen / Healt
112,121–128] combined with the payment ceilings
applied in order to reduce the expected social inequality
[26,69,98]. For example: ‘people aren’t lying dead in the
streets in Norway and Sweden, even though they have
introduced a limited user payment’ [55]. Further evidence
from the opponents regarding OOP payment and social
inequality is based on the dental care experience in
Denmark, as it is the general belief that the existing
OOP payment contributes to social inequality in dental
healthcare [97,112,115].
For the general population, an analysis performed in
2011 by the Centre for Alternative Social Analysis shows
that 73% of the population is against OOP payment for
General Practice. Only 14% believe that there should be
an income-related OOP payment; 13% believe in a ﬁxed
amount; and only 1% of the population believe in full OOP
payment [129]. The fact that the majority of the popula-
tion is against OOP payment is backed up by minor surveys
conducted by various newspapers [29,37,110].
5. Policy windows and advocacy coalitions
The results show that ideology does not seem to be
essential for determining the politicians’ ofﬁcial attitudes
towards OOP payment in Denmark. Thereby not said that
ideology cannot have an inﬂuence on non-ofﬁcial attitudes,
as these could differ from the ofﬁcial attitudes—due to
for example coalitions and compromises between parties.
Only some parties have an attitude in line with their ideo-
logical background, and three out of eight parties change
attitude during the period of the study. Ideology does how-
ever seem to be evident in terms of the arguments as the
for-OOP payment arguments focus on cost-control, efﬁ-
ciency and rationality, while the against-OOP payment
argument focuses on social inequality. In the following, the
results will be discussed using the Kingdon and the advo-
cacy coalition frameworks.
The problem stream in this debate involves the
articulated over-use and unnecessary visits to general prac-
titioners, which put pressure on the primary sector in terms
of both human and ﬁnancial resources. Additionally, the
historical allocation of OOP payment in the Danish health-
care sector is problematised. As shown, both proponents
and opponents agree that it is problematic that there is no
logic behind the allocation in the healthcare sector. This
means that it is an acknowledged claim in the debate that
the current allocation of OOP payment is problematic. With
regards to the politics stream or situational factors,  there
have been external changes that presumably would advo-
cate a policy change in order to introduce OOP payment for
GP. Examples are a liberal–conservative government from
2001 to 2011 as well as the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis
in 2008, which has even further limited increased use of
public resources. This means that the problem stream and
the politics stream run together. As for the policy stream,
several solutions are proposed—also taking social inequal-
ity into account. The policy stream, however, also includes
elements such as feasibility and support. It is legislatively
feasible for the government to change the allocation of OOP
payment in the healthcare sector and to introduce OOP
payment for GP visits [3:70], but this requires a political 117 (2014) 64–71
majority in favour. As the analysis showed, only Liberal
Alliance is consistently in favour of OOP payment for GP,
and the Liberal Alliance only holds nine parliamentary
seats. The Liberal Alliance cooperates with the Liberal Party,
the Conservative Party and the Danish People’s Party, who
all were against OOP payment for GP during their time in
government. The Liberal Party has only recently changed
attitude after becoming opposition, and is now in favour
of OOP payment. The Social Liberal Party has been open
for discussions about changing OOP payment allocation in
the healthcare sector since 2005 – as has the Social Demo-
cratic Party since 2006 – but after forming a government
(together with the Social Liberal Party and the Socialist Peo-
ple’s Party, and with the support of the Unity List) the latter
is now fully against OOP payment for GP.
The changing attitudes implies that this is not a topic
where the resistance towards changing the belief sys-
tems is strong, which in terms of the advocacy coalition
framework implies that the likelihood of cross-coalition
agreement should be relatively high. However, it seems
as if the attitudes change after parties win or lose gov-
ernmental power; it appears that no party in government
wishes to change the ﬁnancing of General Practice. The
analysis showed that the most consistent opponents of
OOP payment for GP are the doctors’ unions, i.e., the gen-
eral practitioners themselves. In the advocacy coalition
framework it is stressed that an inhibitor for cross-
coalition learning is when the policy object is analytically
intractable. Furthermore, social policies where the advo-
cates in the debate are objects of the debate themselves
are mentioned as an example. This creates, if following
the advocacy coalition framework, a hostile policy con-
text, where agreement is difﬁcult, which seems to be the
case in this matter. Additionally, there appears to be a low
degree of public support. This means that neither the (pri-
vate) employees nor the public support the introduction
of OOP payment for GP, which makes it less likely that
a government would risk the unpopularity of introducing
OOP payment for GP. As Sabatier and Jenkins point out: the
belief system may  determine the direction but the ability
to move depends on support. Also, an inhibitor for agree-
ment in this case can be considered to be the heterogeneous
(politicians, interest groups, experts) debate forum, as the
advocacy coalition framework states.
6. Discussion
Debates and discussions about the ﬁnancing of the
health sector are not only relevant in Denmark but also
on an international level as discussions on how to ﬁnance
health care services appear in all countries. The ﬁndings
in this study are, however, mostly relevant to other
high-income countries with similar ﬁnancing structures
and political systems, as the common features increase the
transferability. The previous ﬁnancial and behaviourally
oriented literature about OOP payment has not been able
to explain why OOP payment has been introduced but
focuses merely on the effects of OOP payment for GP. This
systematic analysis of the parliamentary and media debate
on the topic therefore contributes with new knowledge.
Furthermore, the ﬁndings contradict the general (not
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cientiﬁcally proven) assumption that the ﬁnancing of
P is a matter of ideology. Institutional, ideological and
ecision-making perspectives are all combined in the
tudy, which ensure that several angles of the issue are
nvestigated.
There are limitations to this study. By only choos-
ng national newspapers and magazines, arguments have
otentially been missed. It is, though, the belief that all
elevant arguments for the area are recorded in national
edia. The inclusion of all national newspapers, as well
s the period of 22 years, should ensure that all relevant
ocumentation is included and that changes in the debate
re identiﬁed, in order to investigate the research question.
owever, further evidence, such as interviews with civil
ervants, politicians and representatives for the interest
roups, would potentially have strengthened the evidence
nd insights of the ﬁndings. Additionally, it is a limitation
hat only few surveys of the general population’s attitudes
xist. However, as this article investigates the political
ecision-making, the important aspect is what the politi-
ians think the population thinks. The politicians build their
erception of public attitudes from the media and surveys,
hich are what this article is based on.
It can be concluded that the political parties’ ideolog-
cal backgrounds appear to have limited inﬂuence on the
arties’ ofﬁcial attitudes, and that feasibility (coalitions
etween parties) and support (public and professional)
ay  play a bigger part in the decision-making context.
owever, the Danish tradition of the social democratic wel-
are state [130,132:164] might also be of importance as the
ifference between left and right in a Danish political con-
ext can be considered smaller than in other countries. This
ould explain why parties with liberal background do not
ropose OOP payment for GP, thus they are more social-
riented than they would be in other countries. However,
t does not explain why the parties with socialist back-
rounds are open for discussions of OOP payment for GP.
The application of Kingdon’s theory on policy windows
hows that the reason for the ‘resistance’ is a lack of sup-
ort, which is also backed up by the advocacy coalition
ramework analysis that focuses on the resistance from the
octoral unions. It must also be added that the special role
f the GP as a gatekeeper can inﬂuence the decision mak-
ng context, as changing the ﬁnancing of the GP not only
nﬂuences the use of GP, but of the overall health system
n Denmark. By using both frameworks, the importance of
oth public and doctoral (professional) support becomes
vident. Speciﬁc recommendations for policy makers are
herefore not to underestimate the signiﬁcance of health
rofessionals when making policies.
cknowledgements
Signild Vallgårda and Sarah Wadmann gave useful com-
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